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Abstract—As a widely deployed security scheme, text-based
CAPTCHAs have become more and more difficult to resist
machine learning-based attacks. So far, many researchers have
conducted attacking research on text-based CAPTCHAs deployed
by different companies (such as Microsoft, Amazon, and Apple)
and achieved certain results.However, most of these attacks
have some shortcomings, such as poor portability of attack
methods, requiring a series of data preprocessing steps, and
relying on large amounts of labeled CAPTCHAs. In this paper, we
propose an efficient and simple end-to-end attack method based
on cycle-consistent generative adversarial networks. Compared
with previous studies, our method greatly reduces the cost of
data labeling. In addition, this method has high portability.
It can attack common text-based CAPTCHA schemes only by
modifying a few configuration parameters, which makes the
attack easier. Firstly, we train CAPTCHA synthesizers based on
the cycle-GAN to generate some fake samples. Basic recognizers
based on the convolutional recurrent neural network are trained
with the fake data. Subsequently, an active transfer learning
method is employed to optimize the basic recognizer utilizing
tiny amounts of labeled real-world CAPTCHA samples. Our
approach efficiently cracked the CAPTCHA schemes deployed
by 10 popular websites, indicating that our attack is likely very
general. Additionally, we analyzed the current most popular anti-
recognition mechanisms. The results show that the combination
of more anti-recognition mechanisms can improve the security
of CAPTCHA, but the improvement is limited. Conversely,
generating more complex CAPTCHAs may cost more resources
and reduce the availability of CAPTCHAs.
Index Terms—CAPTCHAs, CRNN, Cycle-GAN, Active trans-
fer learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
W ITH the rapid development of the Internet, moreand more online services and website resources are
threatened by malicious bots. These bots perform a series of
malicious actions on the Internet by simulating the identity of
real users, including sending spam, stealing website resources
through crawlers, etc [1], [2]. Therefore, researchers have
proposed a CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing
test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) mechanism to
generate a test for the computer to confirm whether the
remote user is human automatically [3]. Nowadays, various
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CAPTCHA schemes have appeared in the industry, such
as image-based CAPTCHA schemes [4] and voice-based
CAPTCHA schemes [5]. Nonetheless, there are still many
companies using text-based CAPTCHA schemes as the pri-
mary means of security and soft authentication, including
Baidu, Tencent, Amazon, eBay, Microsoft, etc. One of the
main reasons is that the text-based CAPTCHAs have lower
development difficulty and lower maintenance cost than other
types of CAPTCHA schemes. Nevertheless, the widespread
use of text-based CAPTCHA schemes also brings relatively
high-security risks.
The development of CAPTCHA technology is an adver-
sarial process. To improve the security, researchers have
tried to add more anti-recognition security mechanisms for
the existing text-based CAPTCHA schemes. These popular
security mechanisms include the use of multiple font styles,
complicated background interference, character rotation, over-
lapping, distortion, two-layer structures, noisy arcs and com-
plicated background interference, etc [4], [6]–[8]. These se-
curity mechanisms make character segmentation difficult and
make the methods based on deep learning need a large volume
of training data [9]. And in general, tens of thousands of
samples need to be labeled to achieve high attack success
rates [9]–[11]. Furthermore, more and more websites have
added many protection measures to prevent the CAPTCHAs
from being downloaded maliciously by attackers, making it
more challenging to gather real-world CAPTCHA samples
than before.
In this paper, we propose a generic, efficient, and low
cost end-to-end text-based CAPTCHAs breaking method. It
consists of two parts: CAPTCHA synthesizers and CAPTCHA
recognizers. Firstly, we utilized the CAPTCHA synthesizers
based on Cycle-GAN (cycle-consistent generative adversarial
network) [12] to reduce the reliance on real-world data.
Subsequently, we trained the CAPTCHA recognizers based
on CRNN (Convolutional Recurrent Neural Network) [13]. Fi-
nally, we tested our attack on text-based CAPTCHA schemes,
which were deployed by the top 50 most popular websites
such as Baidu, Wikipedia, Microsoft, eBay. The experimental
results show that our method can not only achieve higher
attack success rates but also significantly reduce the costs of
labor in the attack process.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows:
• This paper proposes a synthetic CAPTCHA generation
method based on generating adversarial networks, which
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2effectively solves the problem that it is difficult to label
a large amount of training data manually. By proposing
an approach based on active transfer learning, our model
can learn hard samples that contains more informa-
tion, which significantly reduces the demand for real-
world CAPTCHA samples and the difficulty of breaking
CAPTCHAs.
• The CAPTCHA breaking method in this paper does
not require manual preprocessing of the CAPTCHAs
(such as segmentation, removing interference lines and
backgrounds, and restoring distortion, etc.). It is an end-
to-end process, which means that the final attack results
are not disturbed by the results of upstream process. And
it is more effective for breaking variable-length text-based
CAPTCHA schemes.
• We proved that text-based CAPTCHA schemes have
serious security risks through comparison experiments
of the existing anti-recognition mechanisms. And the
CAPTCHA breaking method employed in this paper
can significantly reduce the protection ability of popular
websites at home and abroad against CAPTCHA breaking
attacks.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion II briefly summarizes previous studies in breaking text-
based CAPTCHAs. Section III introduces the GAN-based
CAPTCHA Synthesizer and the End-to-End CAPTCHA Rec-
ognizer in detail. We evaluate the security of 10 popular real-
world text-based CAPTCHA schemes and make a comprehen-
sive analysis of the effectiveness of existing anti-recognition
schemes in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes this study.
II. RELATED WORK
Text-based CAPTCHA is one of the most widely and
frequently used protection mechanisms in website systems. It
usually contains several English letters or Arabic numerals.
Originally, the designers of CAPTCHAs did not use an effec-
tive anti-segmentation technology, but only added a few noise
points to CAPTCHA images. For this type of CAPTCHA,
Mori et al. [14] employed shape context matching algorithms
to break the EZ-Gimpy and Gimpy with a success rate of 92%
and 33% respectively. With the development of CAPTCHA
recognition technology, designers have added character dis-
tortion mechanisms to increase the difficulty of character
recognition. Chellapilla et al. [15] recognized distorted letters
by machine learning approach, and the success rate increased
from 4.89% to 66.20%. Research studies in [15], [16] show
that the main difficulty of CAPTCHA recognition is character
segmentation, and it is pointed out that the design of anti-
segmentation can better guarantee the security of CAPTCHA
than distorted characters. In 2008, Yan et al. [17] designed
a series of character segmentation strategies for the anti-
segmentation mechanism-based CAPTCHA, which effectively
segmented Microsoft CAPTCHA characters.
Characters overlapping can effectively prevent the character
segmentation. To tackle this problem, Franc et al. [18] em-
ployed an algorithm to obtain prior knowledge of the target
CAPTCHAs through HMM (Hidden Markov Chain), and then
segment the images. Although this method can successfully
segment overlapped characters, but it is only applicable to
the same interference type CAPTCHA. Later, Starostenko
et al. [19] outlined a new character segmentation algorithm.
This algorithm applied complex judgment conditions and prior
knowledge to segment the overlapping characters and achieved
a good result. Nevertheless, this algorithm fails to be generic
because a lot of prior knowledge was used. Goodfellow et al.
[10] combined the positioning, segmentation, and recognition
of multi-character text and built a deep CNN (Convolutional
Neural Networks), then trained with millions of images con-
taining street numbers. Finally, the success rate was over
90%. Zhang et al. [20] proposed a method of CAPTCHA
segmentation based on improved vertical projection, which
efficiently solved the problem of different types of congluti-
nation characters. But for italic characters, this method is not
robust. Later, Tang et al. [4] presented a simple, universal, and
fast text-based CAPTCHA attack approach based on semantic
information understanding and pixel-level segmentation. They
cracked more than 13 kinds of CAPTCHA schemes that were
deployed by the top 50 most popular websites in the world.
The success of the above attack methods depends on the
effectiveness of character segmentation. With the development
of CAPTCHAs, more and more sophisticated anti-recognition
security mechanisms are introduced. It makes segmentation-
based approach hard to work. Consequently, researchers grad-
ually paid more attention to end-to-end methods based on
deep learning. Shi et al. [13] described an end-to-end image
sequence recognition method based on CNN and RNN (re-
current neural networks). They applied their approach to the
field of scene text recognition and achieved state of the art on
multiple open test data sets at that time. Ye et al. [8] proposed
a breaking method based on generating adversarial networks.
They employed pre-trained models based on Pix2Pix [21]
to remove the anti-recognition security mechanism from the
real-word CAPTCHA images and then produced synthetic
CAPTCHA images without any security mechanisms. Finally,
a CNN-based recognition model was trained using a limited
number of target samples and a large volume of synthetic data.
They had achieved impressive results from several CAPTCHA
schemes. Zi et al. [11] presented an end-to-end text-based
CAPTCHA attack method based on convolutional neural net-
work and attention mechanism, which can crack the target
CAPTCHA without any segmentation and preprocessing. They
have achieved not only good results but also experimentally
showed that the existing CAPTCHA security mechanisms
could not effectively resist attacks based on deep learning and
they need to be strengthened urgently.
III. ATTACK APPROACH
In this section, we mainly introduce the GAN-based
CAPTCHA synthesizer and the end-to-end CAPTCHA break-
ing method. Figure 1 shows the attack process of this paper.
A. GAN-based CAPTCHA Synthesizer
As discussed, the breaking approach based on machine
learning and deep learning requires a large volume of labeled
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Fig. 1 Overview of our CAPTCHA breaking approach. Initially, we generated some imitation CAPTCHA images. Subsequently,
GAN-based CAPTCHA synthesizers were trained by using unpaired imitation samples and real-world samples. Then, The
synthesizers were used to produce a great mass of synthetic samples to train the end-to-end basic recognizers. Finally, a
limited number of labeled real-world CAPTCHA data were used to fine-tune the basic recognizers.
training data to obtain recognizers with excellent performance.
However, the data labeling work is time-consuming and labo-
rious, and requires a significant investment. With the aim to
solve this problem, we trains Cycle-GAN-based CAPTCHA
synthesizers. We can produce a massive number of synthetic
training data by means of the CAPTCHA synthesizers to
cover the real-world CAPTCHA sample spaces. This method
dramatically lighten the burden of labeling data manually and
significantly reduces the breaking cost.
CAPTCHA Generation System. We have designed a con-
figurable, scalable, and flexible CAPTCHA generation system
to produce unpaired data to train CAPTCHA synthesizers.
The system contains some configurable settings, including
font, character rotation, overlap, distortion, interference lines,
etc, which almost covers the current popular anti-recognition
mechanisms. We can generate a large amount of imitation
CAPTCHA images that are visually similar to the real-world
ones. In particular, to make the imitation CAPTCHAs similar
to the real ones as much as possible, we have collected
masses of fonts. These fonts are downloaded from website
of fontke.com and are very similar to the target CAPTCHA
scheme fonts. Meanwhile, we analyze the anti-recognition
measures of the target real-world CAPTCHA schemes semi-
automatically, including rotation angle, gap of two characters,
and font color, etc.
TABLE I THE SECURITY MECHANISMS OF WEIBO
CAPTCHA SCHEME
Security
Mechanisms On/Off Values
Fonts On {RM-Playtime-Bold.ttf,RM-Playtime-Medium.ttf}
Font Colors On {RGB(101,101, 254),RGB(254, 101, 101)}
Excluded Characters On {0, 1, 9, i, j, l, o, t}
Rotation On [-10,10]
Gaps of Characters On [0,2]
Distortion Off -
Lines On {Sin}
Background Interference Off -
Taking the CAPTCHA scheme of Weibo as an example,
we first downloaded two hollow fonts that are similar to the
real ones from fontke.com and extracted the colors of real-
world CAPTCHA fonts by a color picker to determine the
font color spaces. Secondly, we ascertained the approximate
range of the rotation angle range to [-10, 10] by correcting the
angle of the real-world CAPTCHA characters. We settled that
the excluded characters contains {’0’, ’1’, ’9’, ’i’, ’j’, ’l’, ’o’,
’t’} by counting the labels of 1,000 correctly labeled images.
Then the gaps of characters were determined by calculating
the number of blank pixels between two adjacent characters.
In various CAPTCHA schemes, line segments, sinusoidal arcs,
and Bzier arcs are commonly used as interference mechanisms
[8]. We concluded that the interference line is based on a
sine function A ∗ sin (ωx+ ϕ) + σ by observing a large
number of Weibo samples. And this scheme draws different
sine arcs by controlling parameters A,ω, ϕ, σ. Finally, we got
the parameter values shown in Table I.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 2 The comparison between the imitation samples and
the real-world Weibo samples: (a) imitation samples without
arc, (b) imitation samples with arc, (c) real-world samples of
Weibo.
The imitation CAPTCHA samples generated by the sys-
tem with the configuration parameters shown in Table I are
compared with the real-world Weibo CAPTCHA samples, as
shown in Figure 2.
CAPTCHA Synthesizer. For the sake of reducing the
gap between the imitation data and the real-world data, the
4imitation images need to be modified from the pixel level. That
is, we need to learn a set of mappings from the given imitation
images X = {xi} , i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} , x ∼ Pdata (x) and the
real-world images Y = {yj} , j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} , y ∼ Pdata (y)
to transform from the generated domain X to the target domain
Y and from the target domain Y to the generated domain X .
Therefore, our CAPTCHA synthesizer consists of four parts:
generators G and F and discriminators DX and DY , as shown
in Figure 3.
Generator G
Generator F
Domain X Domain Y
Fig. 3 The overview structure of our CAPTCHA synthesizer.
To successfully deceive the discriminators DX and DY , the
generators G and F need to learn how to modify the input
images at the pixel level so as to generate images similar
to the target ones. The learning process is shown in Figure
4(a). The generator G encodes the CAPTCHA images x from
the generation domain X , extracts features from images x by
using CNN, and compresses them into 256 feature vectors
of size 8 × 8. Then, the feature vectors of the image in the
generation domain X are transformed into the feature vectors
in the target domain Y , and the low-dimensional features
are recovered from the feature vectors using the upsampling
operation to generate the synthetic CAPTCHA images G(x).
During the upsampling process, the Transptransposed Convo-
lution in reference [12] was replaced as Sub-pixel Convolution
[22], which effectively avoided Checkerboard Artifacts and
improved the image quality after conversion. The generator F
restores the images G(x) to the source domain X according to
the same steps described above and generates the reconstructed
images F (G(x)), where F (G(x)) ≈ x. Discriminator Dy is
a CNN model, which extracts features through multilayer
networks to distinguish whether the input images are the real-
world images y or the synthetic images x.
We define the following adversarial losses to measure the
learning effect of discriminators and generators:
LGAN (G,DY , X, Y ) = Ey∼Pdata(y)[logDY (y)]
+ Ex∼Pdata(x)[log(1−DY (G(x)))]
(1)
where the generator G tries to generate images G(x) that look
sufficiently similar to images from target domain Y , while the
discriminator Dy aims to distinguish between the synthetic
images G(x) and real-world ones y. G aims to minimize
the difference between synthetic images G(x) and real-world
images y against an adversarial Dy tries to maximize it.
Therefore, the training objective defined as follows:
min
G
max
Dy
LGAN (G,DY , X, Y ) (2)
At the same time, we also define similar adver-
sarial loss LGAN (F,DX , Y,X) and training objective
min
F
max
Dx
LGAN (F,DX , Y,X) for generator F and discrimi-
nator Dx.
Since there are many mapping paths between the source
domain and the target domain. It means that the mapping
function may map all samples in the source domain to one
sample in the target domain, making adversarial losses invalid.
Therefore, to reduce the possibility of such mapping and
make reconstructed images consistent with source images in
structure, it is necessary to keep the cyclic consistency in the
process of image conversion and reconstruction (as shown in
Figure 4(b) ) to make F (G(x)) ≈ x and G(F (y)) ≈ y. The
formula is defined as follows:
Lcyc(G,F ) = Ey∼Pdata(y)[‖F (G(y))− y‖1]
+ Ex∼Pdata(x)[‖G(F (x))− x‖1]
(3)
For all the experiments, the model hyperparameters fol-
lowed the default values in Cycle-GAN approach [12].
We use the Adam solver [23] with a batch size of 1 to
train our CAPTCHA synthesizer. All networks were trained
from scratch with a learning rate of 0.0002 and the cycle-
consistency weight λ set to 10 which controls the relative
importance of two objectives. Our final training objective is
defined as:
G∗, F ∗ = argmin
G,F
max
DX ,DY
LGAN (F,DX , Y,X)
+ LGAN (G,DY , X, Y ) + λLcyc(G,F )
(4)
During the training process, when updating the parameters
of the generator, we fixed the parameters of the discriminator.
And when updating the discriminator, we fixed the param-
eters of the generator. For our experiments in this paper,
we used middle-size data sets (contains 1,000 groups of
unpaired images) and terminated the training process after
500 epochs. How to evaluate the results automatically is an
open problem research field of GANs [25], [26]. In the case
of our experiments, we evaluated the results from validation
data when most synthetic CAPTCHA images are similar to
real-world images. For each CAPTCHA scheme, we chose
10 CAPTCHA synthesizers that can synthesize good quality
CAPTCHA images to generate some synthetic samples. We
followed the perceptual study protocol [21], [27] that par-
ticipants were shown multiple groups of CAPTCHA images.
Each group contained a real-world CAPTCHA image and a
synthetic CAPTCHA image. And the participants were asked
to click on images that they thought is real. The one which
fooled most participants had been used as the final CAPTCHA
synthesizer. Then the trained CAPTCHA synthesizer was used
to quickly generated synthetic CAPTCHA images. In our case,
we can get more than a million synthetic samples in a short
time.
B. End-to-End CAPTCHA Recognizer
We obtained massive amounts of synthetic CAPTCHA data
that are highly similar to the target CAPTCHA by using the
synthesizer. Actually, there are still certain differences between
the synthetic CAPTCHAs and the target ones. These differ-
ences are mainly due to the CAPTCHA generation system,
because there are inevitably slight differences between the
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Reconstructed Image 
F(G(x)) in Domain X
Imitation Image x  
 in Domain X
(a)
+
Domain YDomain X
Cycle 
Consistency
Loss
(b)
Fig. 4 The training process of our CAPTCHA synthesizer: (a) The generator G extracts features from domain X and converts
the extracted features into the features of domain Y , and generates synthetic images. These synthetic images are fed into
Generator F to obtain the reconstructed images F (G(x)), where F (G(x)) ≈ x. The discriminator DY needs to correctly
distinguish the synthetic images from the real-world ones. (b) To ensure that the CAPTCHA samples in domain X can be
reconstructed back to their source domain after they are converted to the target domain Y , it is necessary to ensure the
consistency of the conversion effect through the cycle-consistency loss.
manually configured CAPTCHAs generation parameters and
the target CAPTCHAs ones. The purpose of our training of
GAN-based CAPTCHA synthesizer is to minimize the differ-
ence between the generated domain and the target domain.
Still, this difference cannot be eliminated completely. There-
fore, in our CAPTCHA breaking approach, transfer learning
is used to solve the problem of model generalization. Our
solution mainly consists of two steps: 1) training the basic
recognizer using synthetic CAPTCHAs; 2) fine-tuning the
basic recognizer obtained in step 1 using real-world samples
to get the final fine-tuned recognizer. Next, we will introduce
two aspects of model architecture and model training.
The End-to-End CAPTCHA Breaking Network Archi-
tecture. Our CAPTCHA recognizer is based on a CRNN
whose network architecture is designed explicitly for recogniz-
ing sequence-like objects in images. It is mainly composed of
CNN and RNN, and has the following advantages compared
with the traditional CNN-based recognizers:
1) The feature information can be directly learned from the
image without excessive manual preprocessing, such as
segmentation, binarization, etc.
2) Insensitive to the length of the sequence objects in
images, that is, in the case that the number of characters
in images are not fixed, there is no need to train multiple
recognizers for different character lengths.
3) The scale of the model is small, and there are fewer
network parameters. The model has a quickly convergent
velocity and less error.
In this paper, the relatively lightweight CNN5 (A network
structure with five convolutional layers) and bidirectional
LSTM network [28] structures are used, as shown in Figure
5. It should be noted that in the selection process of convo-
lutional networks, we had tried ResNet [29] and DenseNet
[30], respectively. However, due to the larger size and more
parameters of these two networks, more time is needed to
train the CAPTCHA recognizers, and the breaking speed is
slower than the CNN5-based recognizer. More importantly, the
ResNet-based recognizer and the DenseNet-based recognizer
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Fig. 5 The End-to-end CAPTCHA Breaking Network Architecture. The architecture has three components, including the
convolutional blocks, the bidirectional LSTM and a CTC decoder. Firstly, the convolutional blocks consist of five convolutional
layers with LeakyRelu [24], five batch normalizations and five max pooling layers. Secondly, the bidirectional LSTM consists of
two bidirectional LSTM layers which predict a label distribution for each frame. Finally, CTC decoder translates the per-frame
predictions by the recurrent layers into a label sequence.
Input 
Images
Frozen Convolutional Layers 
and Bidirectional LSTM Layers
Fine-tuned 
 Dense Layers
Output
Fig. 6 We freeze the convolutional layers and bidirectional LSTM layers to keep the weights and then fine-tune the parameters
of the top layers in the model by using the real-world CAPTCHAs.
did not significantly improve the prediction results compared
to the CNN5-based recognizer, so the lightweight CNN5 was
finally selected.
The CNN5 is mainly composed of 5 layers of repeated
convolutional layers, max-pooling layers, and normalization
layers, which are applied to extract continuous robust feature
sequences from the input images and serve as the input of
the bidirectional LSTM network. Bidirectional LSTM can
effectively extract text sequence features based on convolution
features and predict the label distribution of each feature
vector. After that, the CTC (Connectionist Temporal Clas-
sification) decoding layer integrated all possible results of
the feature sequences predicted by the LSTM to obtain the
possible probability distribution of each character. It employed
the label sequence with the highest probability as the final
prediction string.
Model Training and Fine-tuning. For each CAPTCHA
scheme, we trained a basic recognizer using the data generated
by the CAPTCHA synthesizer. To obtain relatively accurate
experimental results, we did a lot of pre-research experiments
to search for the best training parameters. Finally, we used
Adam as the optimizer and the learning rate was set to
0.0007. Besides, in the process of training the basic recognizer,
the whole training process will be terminated as soon as
the attack success rate on the validation set are steady and
no longer fluctuates greatly. Generally, our basic recognizer
will rapidly converge within 200 training epochs, and the
success rate on the test set exceeds 90%. Finally, we keep
the network structure consistent and use the transfer learning
method to optimize and update the network weights of the
basic recognizer. During the fine-tuning process, the weight
parameters of all layers except the fully connected layer on
the top of the model are frozen, as shown in Figure 6.
It is challenging to label a large number of CAPTCHA
images manually that can be used to train deep learning
models. In practice, it usually takes about 2 hours to label
500 real-world samples (including the time for validation). We
proposed a method based on active transfer learning to reduce
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Fig. 7 The CAPTCHA recognizer fine-tuning process based on active learning. After several rounds of data screening and
model training, the fine-tuned recognizer can achieve excellent results on the test set.
TABLE II THE ANTI-RECOGNITION MECHANISMS OF TARGET CAPTCHA SCHEMES
Website Sample RotationAnd Distortion Hollow Overlapping
Noise
arc
Variable
Length Multi-Fonts
Background
Interference
Two-layer
Structure
Baidu(1) Yes Yes Yes
Baidu(2) Yes Yes Yes
Baidu(3) Yes Yes Yes
Amazon Yes
Wikipedia Yes Yes
Tencent(1) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tencent(2) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tencent(3) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Microsoft Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Apple Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
eBay Yes Yes Yes
Sina Yes Yes Yes
Sogou Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weibo Yes Yes
the need for labeled data. The main idea is to use synthetic
CAPTCHAs to train a basic recognizer. Subsequently, start
learning form a relatively small training set of real-world
CAPTCHAs based on the basic recognizer, and then add new
training samples in each subsequent round of learning. These
newly added training images are not only hard samples that
contain some characters cannot be correctly recognized by
the current fine-tuned recognizer, but contain a large amount
of useful feature information. Previous studies have showed
that the purpose of breaking CAPTCHAs can be achieved
with a limited number of samples [8], [11]. Therefore, we set
the upper limit of the training set capacity to 500 real-world
samples during fine-tuning the recognizer based on active
learning, and then randomly select 500 unique and labeled
real-world data as the validation set.
Figure 7 shows the complete process of the active transfer
learning approach. First, we fine-tune the pre-trained basic
recognizer by using a small data set which contains 100 real-
world CAPTCHA images. Next, we use the validation data
set to test the fine-tuned recognizer and output the prediction
results. By statistically comparing the predicted labels with the
ground truth, we get all the characters that are misrecognized.
Then selectively label 100 hard samples that contain similar
characters and incrementally add them to the training set, and
continue to fine-tune the recognizer. Repeat the above steps,
once the training samples reach 500, stop the entire fine-
tuning process. Since the training data we used in the fine-
tuning process are informative samples, it can also achieve
a high attack success rate with very few labeled real-world
CAPTCHAs.
8IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Data Preparation
To evaluate the effectiveness of our attack method com-
prehensively, we have chosen 14 CAPTCHA schemes de-
ployed by 10 websites, including Baidu, Wikipedia, Tencent,
Microsoft, Apple, eBay, Weibo, Sina, Amazon, and Sogou,
which are ranked in the top 50 according to the Ranking of
website of Alexa from May 2019 to September 2019. We
found in the survey that some websites will use the same
text-based CAPTCHA scheme (such as Microsoft Live, Bing,
Office, etc.). And some sites have abandoned the use of it
(such as Google, LinkedIn, Alibaba, etc.) instead of using the
Slider CAPTCHA scheme and the Intelligent Non-perceptive
CAPTCHA scheme. Table II lists all the CAPTCHA schemes
we have tested and the popular anti-recognition mechanisms
adopted by these schemes. Several websites have adopted more
than one CAPTCHA scheme. For example, Baidu and Tencent
have deployed multiple CAPTCHA schemes to resist against
CAPTCHA attacks. The main difference among these schemes
is that they use a variety of different fonts.
The experimental process in this paper is mainly divided
into three stages: 1) training of CAPTCHA synthesizer based
on Cycle-GAN; 2) training of end-to-end basic recognizer; 3)
fine-tuning of basic recognizer. In the synthetic model con-
struction phase, we first generated a large number of imitation
images using the CAPTCHA generation system. For each
CAPTCHA scheme, because the content and structure of the
CAPTCHA images are relatively simple and under the premise
of without affecting the result, we only randomly chose 1,000
imitation CAPTCHAs and 1,000 real-world CAPTCHAs as
training sets to minimize the time required for training the
synthesizer(All real-world CAPTCHAs are collected from the
target site by our web crawlers from May 2019 to September
2019). During the training phase of the end-to-end basic
recognizer, we used the CAPTCHA synthesizer to generate
a massive number of synthetic CAPTCHAs as training sets
based on the complexity of the target CAPTCHA scheme.
Then randomly selected 5,000 synthetic samples as test set
and other 5,000 samples as validation set. In the phase of
model fine-tuning, we adopted the fine-tuning method based
on active learning. We set the maximum size of the training
set for fine-tuning to 500 real-world CAPTCHA samples, and
then randomly selected another 1,000 and 500 real-world ones
that did not in training set as test set and validation set.
B. Synthetic CAPTCHA Metrics
Although the images synthesized by the CAPTCHA syn-
thesizer is more like the real-word image than the images
generated by CAPTCHA generation system subjectively, as
shown in Table III. But it is difficult to accurately and
effectively perform quality evaluation and similarity judgment
on the synthetic CAPTCHAs and the imitation ones only
through subjective evaluation. Therefore, different indicators
are needed for objective evaluation. We have selected six dif-
ferent metrics to quantitatively evaluate the quality of imitation
images and synthetic images, and their similarity to real-world
images, including:
TABLE III THE REAL-WORLD CAPTCHAS, THE IMITA-
TION CAPTCHAS AND THE SYNTHETIC CAPTCHAS
Website ImitationSample
Synthetic
Sample
Real-World
Sample
Amazon
Baidu
Wikipedia
Tencent
Sina
Apple
Microsoft
1) SSIM (Structural Similarity Index Measure) [31]. The
SSIM algorithm is used to model image distortion. It
mainly measures the similarity between the generated
images and the real-world images from the aspects of
luminance, contrast, and structure. The larger the SSIM
value, the higher the similarity.
2) PSNR (Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio) [32]. The PSNR
algorithm obtains the quality score by directly calculating
the pixel gray difference value of the corresponding
positions of the generated images and the real-world
images. A higher score indicates that the generated image
has less distortion and higher quality.
3) NRMSE (Normalized Root-Mean-Square Error) [33].
NRMSE directly measures the distance between the gen-
erated images and the real-world images in terms of
pixels. The smaller the value, the closer the two images
are and the more similar they are.
4) EN (Entropy) [34]. EN is used to measure the amount of
information contained in the generated image. The larger
the entropy, the more information it contains.
5) MI (Mutual Information) [35]. MI is used to measure
the gray statistical correlation or information redundancy
between the generated images and the real-world images.
The larger the mutual information value between the two
images, the stronger the correlation between the features
contained in the images.
6) PL (Perceptual Loss) [36]. PL is used to evaluate the
similarity of semantic features between the generated
images and the real-world images. It uses a pre-trained
model to extract various feature information contained
in the generated image and the real-world images and
then calculates the distance between the features of the
two pictures. The smaller the distance, the stronger the
similarity in semantic features between the generated
image and the real-world one.
To prove that the synthetic images are closer to the dis-
tribution of the real-world images than the original imitation
images, we performed corresponding quality evaluations of
the generated images on the Baidu CAPTCHA scheme and
comparison with the real-world CAPTCHAs. For each eval-
uation method, we set up 10 groups of experiments. The
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Fig. 8 Quantitative comparisons. A quantitative comparison across six metrics for Baidu CAPTCHA scheme.
first set of experiments used a total of 6 samples, including
two randomly selected real-world CAPTCHA samples, two
randomly selected imitation samples and their corresponding
synthetic samples processed by the synthesizer. For each
evaluation metric, we calculated the evaluation results between
the imitation samples and the real-world samples, and the
synthetic samples and the real-world samples, respectively.
Following this experimental method, each subsequent set
of experiments adds two additional real-world samples, two
imitation samples, and two corresponding synthetic samples to
the previous group. We calculate the average of the results of
each group and use the mean as the final experimental results
of that group. Figure 8 shows the evaluation results on the six
metrics directly.
TABLE IV ATTACK RESULTS WITH SYNTHETIC SAM-
PLES ON DIFFERENT CAPTCHA SCHEMES
Website Success Rate Epochs Speeds(ms)
Number
of
SamplesOur Attack Ref. [8] Ref. [11]
Sina 85.0% 40.6% 17.6% 74 16 20,000
Tencent 36.1% - - 19 17 50,000
Amazon 88.4% - - 59 16 40,000
Baidu 80.7% - - 46 17 40,000
Wikipedia 26.6% 7.0% - 25 18 120,000
eBay 74.3% 52.0% - 33 17 40,000
Apple 87.7% - 85.7% 46 18 80,000
Weibo 79.8% 4.7% - 33 16 100,000
Sogou 71.7% - - 36 17 100,000
Microsoft
(two-layer
scheme)
22.4% - - 35 18 300,000
The experimental results show that the synthetic images
processed by the synthesizer achieves the best results in the
six evaluation indexes compared with the original imitation
images. The largest SSIM and the smallest NRMSE show
that our synthetic images are more similar in structure and
content to the target images. The largest PSNR indicates that
the synthetic images have less distortion and higher image
quality than the imitation images. The maximized EN and MI
show that our synthetic images contain more abundant feature
information, and the feature correlation between the synthetic
CAPTCHAs and the real-world ones is stronger. Minimized
PL means that the semantic features carried in the synthetic
images are more consistent with the feature distribution of
the target images. From the results, it can be shown that the
CAPTCHAs processed by the synthesizer has better quality
than the original imitation CAPTCHAs and are closer to the
distribution of the real-world CAPTCHAs, which is more
beneficial to subsequent attacks.
C. Attack with synthetic samples on different CAPTCHA
schemes
In order to prove that we can use the synthetic CAPTCHAs
to attack the real-world CAPTCHA schemes effectively, we
deployed our attack on 14 CAPTCHA schemes of 10 pop-
ular websites. For each CAPTCHA scheme, we imitated the
characteristics of it and set the corresponding security feature
parameters, which were loaded by the CAPTCHA generation
system to generate a large number of imitation samples. These
imitation samples are then fed into the CAPTCHA synthesizer
to produce the corresponding processed synthetic samples.
At the same time, according to the complexity of the anti-
recognition mechanism of the CAPTCHA scheme used by
each website, we used different numbers of synthetic samples
as training data (the specific size of the training set is given
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in Table IV) and then obtained a basic recognizer. Finally,
we collected 1,000 real-world CAPTCHA images from each
target website and manually labeled corresponding ground-
truth to test the attack effect of the basic recognizer on real-
world CAPTCHAs. Notably, for some sites, such as Baidu
and Tencent, more than one kind of CAPTCHA scheme is
deployed, including a variety of anti-recognition mechanisms
(listed separately in Table IV). Still, in the experiments, we
did not do differentiate but directly mixed various schemes
of the same website to attack as one scheme. Besides, our
experimental platform is a server running Centos 7 with
version 3.10 of kernel, which is equipped with a 2.30GHz
Intel Xeon Gold 5118 CPU, an NVIDIA RTX2080Ti GPU,
and a memory size of 128GB. All model training and testing
processes are completed on this server, and all models are built
by using the TensorFlow 2.0 deep learning framework.
Table IV summarizes the results of attacks on various
websites using synthetic CAPTCHAs. As can be seen from
the Table IV, our method has a higher attack success rate
in most CAPTCHA schemes, ranging from 22.4% to 88.4%,
compared with the previous attack methods relying on syn-
thetic CAPTCHAs [8], [11]. It shows that our proposed
CAPTCHA synthesis method can produce better quality and
higher similarity synthetic samples than previous methods.
Furthermore, the top 5 attack success rates also prove that
synthetic CAPTCHAs can be directly used to launch an
effective counterfeit attack on the real-world CAPTCHAs. And
it is no longer necessary to label samples manually, which
significantly reduces the labor costs required for the attack.
Moreover, our attack method is an end-to-end process and
does not require any time-consuming segmentation or pre-
processing. The attack speed is breakneck that the average
attack time-consuming ranges from 16 ms to 18 ms, far
exceeding the rate of human recognition and the traditional
segmentation-based attack methods [7], [37].
TABLE V RESULTS OF ATTACKS USING DIFFERENT
NUMBER OF REAL CAPTCHA SAMPLES
Website basicRecognizer 100 200 300 400 500
Weibo 79.8% 85.3% 88.7% 90.0% 89.5% 91.0%
Tencent 36.1% 61.7% 71.1% 74.4% 74.1% 75.4%
Apple 87.7% 88.1% 89.5% 91.4% 91.7% 93.0%
Baidu 80.7% 84.6% 87.6% 88.6% 90.7% 94.0%
Wikipedia 26.6% 75.1% 80.5% 83.5% 86.6% 87.5%
Sogou 71.7% 72.4% 75.6% 77.3% 81.7% 86.6%
eBay 74.3% 85.1 % 87.1% 88.4% 91.7% 92.1%
Sina 85.0% 90.0% 94.6% 94.6% 96.0% 97.6%
Amazon 88.4% 95.1% 95.9% 96.5% 96.6% 97.3%
Microsoft
(two-layer
scheme)
22.4% 23.6% 26.7% 29.7% 32.2% 33.8%
However, it can also be found from the table that, for
the CAPTCHA schemes of some websites, such as Tencent,
Wikipedia, and Microsoft, the breaking success rates are rela-
tively low, respectively 36.1%, 26.6%, and 22.4%. Obviously,
the similarities between the synthetic CAPTCHAs and the
real-world CAPTCHAs are still not good enough. Several
factors lead to this result: (1) The CAPTCHA schemes of
Tencent and Microsoft websites adopt a variety of fonts.
Actually, it is difficult to gather the corresponding fonts,
and we can only use fonts as similar as possible to replace
them. Moreover, the CAPTCHA of Microsoft website adopts
the anti-recognition mechanism with a two-layer structure
and distortion, which makes it difficult for the generation
system and synthesizer to imitate the real-world CAPTCHAs
completely. Therefore, there will be slight differences between
synthetic samples and real-world samples. Although it does
not affect the successful recognition of images by humans,
but for deep neural networks, these subtle differences will be
amplified after multiple activation layers, and will eventually
cause incorrect output. (2) The length of the CAPTCHA
content of Wikipedia and Microsoft websites is generally too
long (it typically contains 8 to 10 characters), which means
that the model needs to recognize longer sequences. Any
character prediction error will make this attack task fail, thus
increasing the difficulty of attack.
D. Attack based on active transfer learning
To solve the problem of low attack success rate caused
by the difference between the synthetic CAPTCHAs and
the real-world CAPTCHAs, we utilize the method based on
active transfer learning to train the basic recognizer to further
improve the attack success rates on the target CAPTCHA
schemes. Table V summarizes the attack results after fine-
tuning the basic recognizer with different numbers of real-
world samples. We can find from the table that with the
continuous increase of real-world samples, the success rates
of attacks have been improved. After fine-tuning with 100
real-world samples, for those CAPTCHA schemes that make
the basic recognizer get lower success rates, such as Tencent,
Wikipedia, and eBay, the attack success rates are greatly
improved, with an increase ranging from 10.8% to 48.5%.
The main reason is that the training data we selected is the
hard samples that contain more useful feature information.
Therefore, the model can learn from these samples and then
adjust the network parameters to reduce the error caused by
the synthetic CAPTCHAs, thereby better fitting the real-world
CAPTCHAs distribution. When using 500 real samples, the
attack success rate on 9 websites exceeded 75%, and the attack
success rate on 6 sites exceeded 90%. It shows that these
CAPTCHA schemes cannot effectively resist our attack. At the
same time, it is not difficult to find that most of the CAPTCHA
schemes that have been successfully cracked adopt fewer
anti-recognition mechanisms. For example, the CAPTCHA
scheme of Amazon only uses rotation; the CAPTCHA scheme
of Sina only employs hollow fonts and noise arcs. It is
worth mentioning that although the attack success rate of
Tencent CAPTCHA scheme is quite low (only 75.4%). But
we found in the process of collecting real-world samples that
its CAPTCHA sample pool is minimal (only contains about
4,500 CAPTCHA images), which is very vulnerable to MD5
dictionary attack. Also, we can find that the attack effect on
Microsoft is relatively inadequate. After fine-tuning with 500
samples, it can only achieve a success rate of 33.8%. The
main reason is that the two-layer structure scheme, multiple
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TABLE VI COMPARED WITH THE RESULTS OF PREVIOUS ATTACKS
Website Our Attack Ref. [8] Ref. [11]
Success Rate Number ofReal-World Samples Success Rate
Number of
Real-World Samples Success Rate
Number of
Real-World Samples
Weibo 91.0% 500 44.0% 500 90.2% 8,000
Tencent 75.4% 500 - - - -
Apple 88.1% 100 - - 83.7% 8,000
Baidu 94.0% 500 - - 92.2% 2,000
Wikipedia 87.5% 500 78.0% 500 86.8% 2,000
Sogou 86.6% 500 - - - -
eBay 87.1% 200 86.6% 500 - -
Sina 90.0% 100 52.6% 500 86.2% 10,000
Amazon 95.1% 100 79.0% 500 - -
Microsoft(two-layer scheme) 33.8% 500 - - - -
artistic fonts, and excessive distortion of image content, which
still leaves a large gap between our synthetic CAPTCHAs and
the real-world Microsoft CAPTCHAs. Only a small amount
of fine-tuning training data cannot significantly reduce the
difference.
To directly demonstrate the accuracy of each CAPTCHA
scheme when using different numbers of training data, we
present a graph, as shown in Figure 9. In general, with the
increasing of real-world samples, the attack success rates
also continue to increase. However, for Weibo and Tencent
CAPTCHA schemes, after the training set is increased from
300 to 400, the success rate decrease slightly. The main reason
is that the training set is smaller than test set, after the new
samples are added, the training set generates sample imbalance
problem, which makes the data distribution of the training set
and the test set considerably different. As a result, the accuracy
is reduced.
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Fig. 9 The impact of the number of real-world CAPTCHA
samples for the success rate of fine-tuned model.
For most CAPTCHA schemes, such as Apple, eBay, Ten-
cent, Sina, Amazon, Weibo, and Baidu, when the number
of training samples used for fine-tuning exceeded 200, the
model achieved a high attack success rate. With the further
increase of samples, the success rate improved, but the effect
was not noticeable. And the overall success rate tended to be
stable. Compared with previous studies [8], [11] (as shown
in Table VI), for each target CAPTCHA scheme, our method
requires fewer real-world CAPTCHAs when achieving similar
or higher success rates, ranging from 100 samples to 500
samples. The results show that our proposed method based on
active transfer learning can undoubtedly improve the breaking
effect while using small-scale data sets. It effectively reduces
the workload of manually labeled samples, and significantly
reducing the difficulty of breaking text-based CAPTCHAs.
E. Effect of varied CAPTCHA security mechanisms
In this experiment, we explored the effectiveness of var-
ious popular CAPTCHA security mechanisms to provide a
reference for designing more robust CAPTCHA schemes. We
consider a total of 12 security schemes, including 8 single
security schemes such as rotation, character overlap, image
content distortion, interference lines, etc, and 4 combined
security schemes, as shown in Table VII. For each scenario,
we used the CAPTCHA generation system to generate 40,000
samples as the training set, 4,000 samples as the validation set,
and 4,000 samples as the test set. During training, when the
accuracy of the recognizer on the validation set has stabilized
and no longer changes, we terminate the training process and
test the CAPTCHA recognizer on the test set and get the
predicted results, as shown in Table VII.
94.9%
93.3%
89.2% 88.6% 87.5%
86.2% 85.3%
10 50 100 150 200 250 300
Number of fonts
65
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
At
ta
ck
 s
uc
ce
s 
ra
te
(%
)
Fig. 10 The impact of the number of fonts for attack success
rate.
We can find from the Table VII that all the CAPTCHA
schemes using these 12 security mechanisms have been
cracked. Among the first eight CAPTCHA schemes with a
single security mechanism, our method can achieve a success
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TABLE VII TWELVE KINDS OF CAPTCHA SECURITY MECHANISMS
No Sample Rotation Overlapping Distortion Multi-Fonts Noisearc
Variable
Length
Background
Interference
Two-layer
Structure
Ground
Truth
Success
Rate
1 Yes 1F6XD5 97.4%
2 Yes 27Q9PG 95.1%
3 Yes 5V7S7U 96.1%
4 Yes AGR3Q6 94.9%
5 Yes 385WW3 97.5%
6 Yes XSF5F 96.0%
7 Yes KE14NW 96.6%
8 Yes BMEX6K 94.4%
9 Yes Yes Yes C9UZ2H 80.0%
10 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 28M7PC 62.1%
11 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes RBADSP 47.4%
12 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes H75QAA 10.6%
rate higher than 94%, which also indicates that the CAPTCHA
schemes using only one security mechanism is not secure.
And it cannot effectively resist automated attacks. Although
the CAPTCHA with only one security mechanism had low
security, but the attack success rate dropped sharply from
97.5% to 10.6% as more security mechanisms were added.
For example, scheme No.12 adds only two additional security
mechanisms based on scheme No.11, but the attack success
rate decreased from 47.4% to 10.6%, with a drop of 36.8%.
Obviously, combining more security mechanisms plays an
essential role in designing more robust CAPTCHA schemes.
Besides, we also noticed that among the first eight schemes
with a single security mechanism, the CAPTCHA scheme
using multi-fonts security mechanism is slightly more se-
cure than the other six schemes. Therefore, we designed an
additional experiment to verify whether the scheme using
only multi-fonts security mechanism can achieve the similar
effect of the scheme using combined security mechanisms.
The experimental results are shown in Figure 10, where the
abscissa represents the number of used font types. Although
the success rate is gradually decreasing with the increase in
the types of used fonts, but the resistance effect is not very
prominent. It is not better than the scheme No. 9, which
uses three security mechanisms. Therefore, if only multi-
fonts security mechanism is used in the design of CAPTCHA
schemes, even if a large number of fonts are used, the attack
of our method cannot be effectively resisted. And collecting a
massive amount of fonts is a very tedious task, which requires
a volume of workforce and time to check the availability of
each font.
As a result, it is crucial to design a CAPTCHA scheme
that can resist the attack based on deep learning. We think
that there are two CAPTCHA design ideas: one is to fool the
CAPTCHA recognizers based on machine learning or deep
learning by using adversarial examples [38], [39]. That is, by
adding some disturbances that are hard to detect by human to
CAPTCHA images so that the normal CAPTCHA recognizers
output wrong prediction results. Another design idea is to
make full use of human excellent logical reasoning, semantic
understanding, and other abilities to enhance the robustness
of CAPTCHA. The reason is that the advanced behaviors of
creatures are currently challenging to be imitated by computer.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an end-to-end text-based
CAPTCHA breaking method based on generative adversar-
ial networks. We trained cycle-GAN-based synthesizers to
generate a great number of synthetic CAPTCHA samples,
which solves the problem of lacking of training data. And
we proposed a model training method based on active transfer
learning, using a small amount of hard samples with more
information to fine-tune the pre-trained deep learning models.
We also cracked a large number of real-world CAPTCHAs that
are deployed by the top 50 websites as ranked by Alexa.com.
The success rates ranged from 33.8% to 97.6%. Compared
with previous studies, our approach requires less labeled real-
world data when reaching the same or higher attack success
rates, ranging from 100 to 500 samples. And our method has
better versatility. For a new text-based CAPTCHA scheme, we
can quickly break it without investing a lot of labor and time.
At the same time, We analyzed the security of 12 pop-
ular anti-recognition mechanisms. The experimental results
demonstrate that more security mechanisms can improve the
safety of the CAPTCHAs. Nevertheless, once attackers obtain
a massive number of training data through various methods,
these security mechanisms may no longer be valid. This shows
that the current text-based CAPTCHA schemes are insecure
and cannot resist attacks based on machine learning and
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deep learning. Finally, we proposed suggestions for the future
development of CAPTCHAs based on the shortcomings of the
existing CAPTCHA schemes. We also hope that the work of
this paper can provide a reference for security experts to design
some CAPTCHA schemes with both security and availability.
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